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The close relationship between Sims and Jellicoe identifies that these were leaders who were 
equipped with the knowledge of how to win the First World War. The ‘special Anglo-American 
relationship’ between them is reflective of the virtuous cycle of how Corbett and Mahan influenced 
these leaders through the study of naval history. Mahan was greatly influenced by Professor John 
Laughton who while at the Royal Naval College and Kings College London began the development 
of ‘scientific’ naval history as the means for the ‘higher education’ of naval officers in matters of 
strategy and tactics, from theory to practice. 
By pulling on threads and echoes of the First World War that can be found in the 21st 
century, we can reflect on the roots of naval education and the role that naval historians have in the 
education of naval officers and civilian decision makers. Just as Laughton was vital to the education 
of naval officers in an age of absence of large-scale naval warfare where actual practical experience 
could not be had but technical change was taking place, today historians seek the next generation 
intellectual revolution that protects the institutional wisdom gathered in a navy’s past experiences. 
They can do this by creating and encouraging an environment through scholarly practice where 
naval history and the study of maritime strategy can deliver the thinking and leaders ready for the 
challenges of today and tomorrow.  
Drawing together examples from the Great War, to the 1982 Falkland’s War and beyond, 
examples can be found of challenges that naval historians warned of where fluctuating doctrine, 
overabundance of terminology and excessive, often unjustified, planning was due to the 
‘parachuting’ of personalities and ideas from history to create strategy, tactics and doctrine with little 
or no evidence of understanding of these perspectives. This potentially resulting in the risk of a 
fundamental maritime disconnect, lackluster organizational self-reflection and reform just as 
historians have seen before. In recent times, these processes being no longer influenced by naval 
historians, has undermined the thinking environment and introduced numerous dangers such as 
rigidity into planning and doctrine, which could and has before, come back to haunt naval officers at 
critical junctures as events and changes in the world around them unfolded. This is in stark contrast 
to how the first pioneers of intellectual naval history, who’s actions prepared and influenced naval 
personnel, resulted in a cadre of forward looking officers such as John Fisher, Sims and Jellicoe who 
were equipped with the necessary qualities to meet the grand challenge of the First World War and 
ultimately how they could deliver victory.   
In contemporary times, historians, whose roles had been reduced in modern navies, started 
to ponder if ‘talking’ history and understanding history where two different methodologies that 
threatened the ability to deliver relevant inquisitive thinkers while ploughing historians, other 
academic disciplines and professionals into disagreement on the direction of naval education and 
wider spectrum of defense debates. This alternative approach convinced naval leaders and defense 
professionals by the 21st century to expect direct answers from history to modern issues whereas 
they could have been analyzing the subject in breadth, depth and context, just as Corbett and Mahan 
did over a century ago, to seek better understanding of our naval past and create the new solutions 
for the era they need to operate in. Laughton, Luce, Corbett, Mahan and others, melded perspectives 
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on the sea as a strategic environment which in turn could deliver individuals who could innovate and 
think for whatever challenges they faced, rather than being placed in a system of easily discredited 
and stagnating mantras where events, tempo of operations, tactics and technology may have already 
been over taken by unchallenged theory and practice. The more recent approaches resulted in 
ignorance to often uncomfortable and inconvenient similarities of challenges our forebears had 
faced and the isolation of the study of history. In addition to this, historians, past thinkers and 
leaders are regularly dismissed as products of their times or the eras they study, rather than being 
acknowledged as educators of the repository of naval experience and wisdom they guard for 
practitioners, thinkers, fighters, leaders and scholars alike, who should be all too often, inseparable.   
 
